Macro II

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Introduction

- Today: Market structure
- Complete markets:
 - Arrow-Debreu structure (time-0 contingent claims);
 - Arrow securities (sequentially traded one-period claims).
- Homework will definitely show up on my website in the next day or two.

Complete markets

- Individuals in the economy have access to a comprehensive set of risk-sharing contracts:
 - They can contract to insure against any event or sequence of events.
 - They write these contracts with other agents in the economy.
- Will lead to
 - Perfect risk sharing
 - i.e., representative agent.

Complete markets

- Define unconditional probability of sequence of shocks s^t = [s₀, s₁, ..., s_t] to be π_t(s^t).
- Assume there are i = 1, ..., I consumers, each of whom receives a stochastic endowment yⁱ_t(s^t).
- They purchase a consumption plan that stipulates consumption for any history of shocks and yields:

$$U_i(c^i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u_i[c_t^i(s^t)] \pi_t(s^t)$$

▶ These contracts yield expected lifetime utility, where $\lim_{s\to 0} u'_i(c) = +\infty$

Complete markets

They purchase a consumption plan that stipulates consumption for any history of shocks and yields:

$$U_i(c^i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u_i[c_t^i(s^t)] \pi_t(s^t)$$

And are subject to a feasibility constraint:

$$\sum_{i} c_t^i(s^t) \leq \sum_{i} y_t^i(s^t) \; \forall \; t, \; s^t$$

These contracts determine how to split resources at each t.
i.e., they insure individuals ex-ante against income risk.

Contingent claims trading structure

Arrow-Debreu structure: contract at time t = 0 on every possible sequence of shocks.



- Each node represents a possible sequence of shocks.
- A consumption plan would specify consumption at each node at each time.

Sequential trading structure

Arrow securities: re-contract at ever t given the history of shocks s^t.





Trading structure

- Arrow-Debreu structure: contract at time t = 0 on every possible sequence of shocks.
- Arrow securities: re-contract at ever t given the history of shocks s^t.
- Do these trading structure yield the same equilibrium allocation? Yes.
- Important property:
 - Under either structure, allocations are a function of the aggregate state only (& initial conditions).
 - i.e., allocation depends only on $\sum_{i=1}^{l} y_t^i(s^t)$
- Leads to representative agent structure.

Planner's Problem

First, we will find the Pareto optimal allocation.

▶ i.e., the allocation from solving the Social Planner's problem:

$$\max_{c^i} W = \sum_{i=1}^l \lambda_i U_i(c^i)$$

- where λ_i is a "Pareto weight," i.e., how much Planner values individual *i* relative to others.
- Constrained maximization:

$$L = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{t}} \{ \sum_{i=1}^{l} \lambda_{i} \beta^{t} u_{i}(c_{t}^{i}) \pi_{t}(s^{t}) + \theta_{t}(s^{t}) \sum_{i=1}^{l} [y_{t}^{i}(s^{t}) - c_{t}^{i}(s^{t})] \}$$

 i.e., maximize weighted expected utility subject to the feasibility constraint (multiplier θ)

Planner's Problem

Constrained maximization:

$$L = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{t}} \{ \sum_{i=1}^{l} \lambda_{i} \beta^{t} u_{i}(c_{t}^{i}) \pi_{t}(s^{t}) + \theta_{t}(s^{t}) \sum_{i=1}^{l} [y_{t}^{i}(s^{t}) - c_{t}^{i}(s^{t})] \}$$

FOC in c_t^i :

$$\beta^t u_i'(c_t^i(s^t))\pi_t(s^t) = \lambda_i^{-1}\theta_t(s^t)$$

How is this allocated across consumers?

$$egin{aligned} & rac{u_i'(c_t^i(s^t))}{u_1'(c_t^1(s^t))} = rac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_i} \ & o c_t^i(s^t) = u_i'^{-1}(\lambda_i^{-1}\lambda_1u_1'(c_t^1(s^t))) \end{aligned}$$

▶ Often, assume $\lambda_i = \lambda_1 \forall i \rightarrow c_t^i(s^t) = u_i'^{-1}(u_1'(c_t^1(s^t)))$

Planner's Problem

Allocation:

$$c_t^i(s^t) = u_i'^{-1}(\lambda_i^{-1}\lambda_1 u_1'(c_t^1(s^t)))$$

Sub into resource constraint:

$$\sum_{i} u_{i}^{\prime-1}(\lambda_{i}^{-1}\lambda_{1}u_{1}^{\prime}(c_{t}^{1}(s^{t}))) = \sum_{i} y_{t}^{i}(s^{t})$$

i.e., the resource allocation depends only on aggregate endowment and weights of each consumer.

Decentralized allocations

We know that the optimal allocation is given by

$$\sum_{i} u_{i}^{\prime-1}(\lambda_{i}^{-1}\lambda_{1}u_{1}^{\prime}(c_{t}^{1}(s^{t}))) = \sum_{i} y_{t}^{i}(s^{t})$$

- Can we achieve the same allocation under different trading regimes?
- Specifically, does the decentralized economy achieve the same allocation?

Consumer's problem

Consumer's problem: maximize

$$U_i(c^i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u_i[c_t^i(s^t)] \pi_t(s^t)$$

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} q_t^0(s^t) c_t^i(s^t) \le \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} q_t^0(s^t) y_t^i(s^t)$$

Consumer's problem

Yields the following:

$$\beta^{t} u_{i}'[c_{t}^{i}(s^{t})]\pi_{t}(s^{t}) = \mu_{i}q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})$$
$$\frac{u_{i}'(c_{t}^{i}(s^{t}))}{u_{1}'(c_{t}^{1}(s^{t}))} = \frac{\mu_{i}}{\mu_{1}}$$

which implies

$$\sum_{i} u_{i}^{\prime-1}(\mu_{1}^{-1}\mu_{i}u_{1}^{\prime}(c_{t}^{1}(s^{t}))) = \sum_{i} y_{t}^{i}(s^{t})$$

Competitive Equilibrium

 $\begin{array}{l} \textbf{Definition} \quad \text{A competitive equilibrium is a price system} \\ \{q^0_t(s^t)\}_{t=0}^\infty \text{ and allocation } \{c^{i*}\}_{i\in\mathcal{I}} \text{ such that} \end{array}$

1. Given a price system, each individaul $i \in \mathcal{I}$ solves the following problem:

$$\{c_t^{j*}(s^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty} = \arg \max_{\{c_t^{i}(s^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u(c_t^{i}(s^t)) \pi_t(s^t)$$

$$s.t. \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} q_t^0(s^t) c_t^{i}(s^t) \le \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} q_t^0(s^t) y_t^{i}(s^t)$$

2. On every history s^t at time t, market clears

$$\sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}}c_t^{i*}(s^t)=\sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}}y_t^i(s^t)$$

Rules out economies with externalities, incomplete markets, etc.

First Welfare Theorem

First welfare theorem:

Let c be a competitive equilibrium allocation. Then c is pareto efficient.

Equivalence: Competitive equilibrium is a specific Pareto optimal allocation in which λ_i = μ_i⁻¹.

Sequential trading

- Now, we will consider an economy with sequential trades.
- i.e., each period agents meet and trade state-contingent bonds
- Recall from asset pricing:

$$p_{t} = \beta E_{t} \left(rac{u'(d_{t+1})}{u'(d_{t})} (p_{t+1} + d_{t+1})
ight)$$

- where the expectation is over realizations of s_{t+1}, which determines d_{t+1}.
- Price is determined by payout of asset across all different realizations.
- i.e., asset that provides good return across all realizations: expensive.

Market clearing

- Recall from asset pricing that the net bond position of the economy equaled zero.
- ▶ i.e., $\sum_{i} b_{t+1}^{i} = 0.$
- Same in this context.
- Some are borrowing and some are saving (in principle, if there were heterogeneity).
- This must net to zero.

Restriction: No Ponzi Schemes

- Must ensure that agents never take out too much debt.
- Natural debt limit:

$$A_t^i(s^t) = \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^\tau \mid s^t} q_\tau^t(s^\tau) y_\tau^i(s^\tau)$$

- This is the amount that the agent could borrow and still commit to repay.
- Rules out Ponzi schemes.

Sequential problem

Consumer's problem: maximize

$$U_i(c^i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u_i[c_t^i(s^t)] \pi_t(s^t)$$

subject to

$$egin{aligned} c_t^i + \sum_{s^{t+1}} Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) a_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1},s^t) &\leq y_t^i(s^t) + a_t^i(s^t) \ -t + 1^i(s^{t+1}) &\geq -A_{t+1}^i(s^{t+1}) \end{aligned}$$

where Q_t is a pricing kernel: price of one unit of consumption given realization s_{t+1} and history s^t.

Sequential allocation

 Solving the previous problem yields the following Euler Equation:

$$Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) = \beta \left(\frac{u'(c_{t+1}^i(s^{t+1}))}{u'(c_t^i(s^t))} \pi_t(s^{t+1}|s^t) \right)$$

- Same as the asset pricing specification from earlier.
- Taking the expectation of this expression across all possible realizations of s^{t+1} yields the price, Q.

Sequential Trading - Competitive Equilibrium

Definition A competitive equilibrium is a price system $\{ \{Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t)\}_{s_{t+1}\in S} \}_{t=0}^{\infty}, \text{ an allocation} \\ \left\{ \{\tilde{c}_t^i(s^t), \{\tilde{a}_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1},s^t)\}_{s_{t+1}\in S} \}_{t=0}^{\infty} \right\}_{i\in\mathcal{I}}, \text{ an initial distribution of wealth} \\ \{a_0^i(s_0) = 0\}_{i\in\mathcal{I}}, \text{ and a collection of natural borrowing limits} \\ \left\{ \{A_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1},s^t)\}_{s_{t+1}\in S} \right\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \right\}_{i\in\mathcal{I}} \text{ such that}$

- 1. Given a price system, an initial distribution of wealth, and a collection of natural borrowing limits, each individual $i \in \mathcal{I}$ solves the workers problem.
- 2. On every history s^t at time t, markets clear.

 $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} c_t^i(s^t) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} y_t^i(s^t) \qquad (\text{Commodity market clearing})$ $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} a_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1}, s^t) = 0 \forall \ s_{t+1} \in S \qquad (\text{Asset market clearing})$

Equivalence of allocations

- Is this allocation also a time-0 trading allocation?
- Yes. Suppose that the pricing kernel takes the following form

$$egin{aligned} &q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1}) = Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t)q_t^0(s^t) \ &q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1}) \ &q_t^0(s^t) = Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) \end{aligned}$$

- That is, the price of 1 unit of consumption in period t + 1 is the same regardless of whether you purchased that consumption last period or in period 0.
- When this holds, sequential allocation coincides with time-0 trading allocation, subject to initial distribution.
- ► Formal proof (check on your own):

 formal proof

Conclusion

- Midterm next Thursday (after break)!
- Check website for homework.

Equivalence of allocations

$$\begin{aligned} Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) &= \frac{q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1})}{q_t^0(s^t)} \Rightarrow \beta \frac{u'\left(\tilde{c}_{t+1}^i(s^{t+1})\right)}{u'\left(\tilde{c}_t^i(s^t)\right)} \pi_t(s^{t+1}|s^t) \\ &= \beta \frac{u'\left(c_{t+1}^{i*}(s^{t+1})\right)}{u'\left(c_t^{i*}(s^t)\right)} \pi_t(s^{t+1}|s^t) \end{aligned}$$

▲ back

Guess for portfolio

On every history s^t at time t,

$$ilde{a}^{i}_{t+1}(s_{t+1},s^{t}) = \sum_{ au=t+1}^{\infty} \; \sum_{s^{ au} \mid (s_{t+1},s^{t})} rac{q^{0}_{ au}(s^{ au})}{q^{0}_{t+1}(s^{t+1})} \Big(c^{i*}_{ au}(s^{ au}) - y^{i}_{ au}(s^{ au}) \Big) orall \; s_{t+1} \in \mathbb{R}^{n}$$

Value of this portfolio expressed in terms of the date t, history s^t consumption good is $\sum_{s_{t+1} \in S} \tilde{a}_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1}, s^t)Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) =$

$$= \sum_{s_{t+1}\in S} \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|(s_{t+1},s^t)} \frac{q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1})} \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_t^i(s^{\tau}) \Big) Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) \\ = \sum_{s_{t+1}\in S} \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|(s_{t+1},s^t)} \frac{q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1})} \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_t^i(s^{\tau}) \Big) \frac{q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1})}{q_t^0(s^t)} \\ = \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^t} \frac{q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_t^0(s^t)} \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_t^i(s^{\tau}) \Big) \Big)$$



Verify portfolio

On history $s^0 = s_0$ at time t = 0, assume that $a_0^i(s_0) = 0$. Then

Therefore, given $\tilde{c}_0^i(s_0) = c_0^{i*}(s_0)$, portfolio $\{\tilde{a}_1^i(s_1, s_0)\}_{s_1 \in S}$ is affordable.

Verify portfolio

On history
$$s^{t}$$
 at time t , assume that
 $\tilde{a}_{t}^{i}(s^{t}) = \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} \frac{q_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau})}{q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})} \left(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^{i}(s^{\tau}) \right)$. Then
 $\tilde{c}_{t}^{i}(s^{t}) + \sum_{s_{t+1} \in S} \tilde{a}_{t+1}^{i}(s_{t+1}, s^{t})Q_{t}(s_{t+1}|s^{t}) = y_{t}^{i}(s^{t})$
 $+ \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} \frac{q_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau})}{q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})} \left(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^{i}(s^{\tau}) \right)$
 $\tilde{c}_{t}^{i}(s^{t}) + \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} \frac{q_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau})}{q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})} \left(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{t}^{i}(s^{\tau}) \right) = y_{t}^{i}(s^{t})$
 $+ \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} \frac{q_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau})}{q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})} \left(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^{i}(s^{\tau}) \right)$

▲ back

Verify portfolio

On history
$$s^{t}$$
 at time t , assume that
 $\tilde{a}_{t}^{i}(s^{t}) = \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} \frac{q_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau})}{q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})} \left(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^{i}(s^{\tau})\right).$ Then
 $q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})c_{t}^{i*}(s^{t}) + \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} q_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau}) \left(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{t}^{i}(s^{\tau})\right) = q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})y_{t}^{i}(s^{t})$
 $+ \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} q_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau}) \left(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^{i}(s^{\tau})\right) \qquad (\text{ if } \tilde{c}_{t}^{i}(s^{t}) = c_{t}^{i*}(s^{t}))$
 $\to \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} q_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau}) \left(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^{i}(s^{\tau})\right) = \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} q_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau}) \left(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^{i}(s^{\tau})\right)$

Therefore, given $\tilde{c}_t^i(s^t) = c_t^{i*}(s^t)$, portfolio $\{\tilde{a}_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1}, s^t)\}_{s_{t+1} \in S}$ is affordable.