Quantitative Macro-Labor: Disciplining Wage Contracts with Convex Preferences

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Announcements

- Today: Extend Burdett-Mortensen to environment where firms post wage-tenure contracts instead of wages.
- Research Proposal/Introduction: Due next Thursday.
- Short presentations the following Tuesday.
- I may have to cancel class at some point next week due to jury duty.

The Burdett-Mortensen Model

- What is an (one of many) important and realistic feature of the labor market missing in the standard McCall model?
- The ability to search while employed.
- Some statistics:
 - 1. 50% of all hires are job-to-job hires (Census)
 - 2. Movement up job ladder accounts for 50% of wage growth for young workers (Topel and Ward, 1992)
 - 3. 70% of fall in hires during Great Recession was J2J.
- But, wages also increase with *tenure*.
- BM model can't account for this.

The Burdett-Mortensen OTJS Model

Basic idea:

- 1. Workers can be in one of two states: employed or unemployed, with value functions V, U.
- 2. Firms post wages, i.e., a given distribution of wages, $w \in [\underline{w}, \overline{w}], w \sim F(.)$.
- 3. Unemployed receive job offers at exogenous rate α , no prior info.
- 4. Employed job offers at exogenous rate λ , no prior info.
- 5. Separate two ways: exogenously (rate δ) and via thru OTJS (rate $\lambda[1 F(w)]$)
- 6. Linear utility: u(c) = b or u(c) = w.
- Firms cannot respond to outside offers.
- Are these contracts optimal?

The Burdett-Mortensen Model

Flow value of unemployment:

$$rU = b + \alpha \int_{\underline{w}}^{\overline{w}} \max\{V(x) - U, 0\} dF(x)$$
(1)

Employment:

$$rV(w) = w + \lambda \int_{\underline{w}}^{\overline{w}} \max\{V(x) - V(w), 0\} dF(x) + \delta(U - V(w))$$
(2)

Thus, the reservation wage is

$$w_R = b + (\alpha - \lambda) \int_{w_R}^{\bar{w}} \frac{[1 - F(x)]}{r + \delta + \lambda [1 - F(w_R)]} dx \qquad (3)$$

The Firm

- Assume equilibrium conditions & $\lambda = \alpha$.
- Define π^V as the profits of a vacant firm.
- Firm profit function:

$$\pi^{V} = \max_{w}(p-w)I(w|w_{R},F)$$
(4)

$$\pi^{V}(w|w_{R},F) = (p-w)I(w|w_{R},F)$$
(5)

$$I(w|w_R,F) = \frac{m\alpha\delta}{(\delta + \alpha[1 - F(w)])^2}$$
(6)

What is /? It is the probability of meeting a workers and the expected duration a worker employed at wage w will be employed with a firm.

Matched Firm Value

Matched firm profit function:

$$r\pi^{F}(w|w_{R},F) = (p-w) + \alpha[1-F(w)](\pi^{V} - \pi^{F}(w|w_{R},F)) + \delta(\pi^{V} - \pi^{F}(w|w_{R},F))$$
(7)
(8)

Would a matched firm prefer to retain a worker?

$$r\pi^{F}(w_{R}|w_{R},F) = (p - w_{R}) + \alpha[1 - F(w_{R})](\pi^{V} - \pi^{F}(w_{R}|w_{R},F)) + \delta(\pi^{V} - \pi^{F}(w_{R}|w_{R},F))$$
(9)
$$r\pi^{F}(w_{R}|w_{R},F) = (p - w_{R}) + (\alpha + \delta)(\pi^{V} - \pi^{F}(w_{R}|w_{R},F))$$
(10)

- ▶ $\pi^F \ge \pi^V$. Why is this?
- The firm would prefer to retain a worker.
- Maybe there is room for better contracts?

Burdett and Coles (2003)

- Another way of thinking about on-the-job search: moral hazard.
- Firm can't contract on worker behavior: worker can leave anytime it finds a higher wage.
- How could we allow a firm to handle this?
 - 1. Respond to outside offers. (doesn't make sense in model with identical productivity).
 - 2. Write contracts that change wages to mitigate moral hazard.
- What does option 2 mean? They will increase wages the longer a worker remains employed.
- Backloaded contracts: option value larger so worker wants to stay.

Outline (Burdett-Coles, 2003)

Preferences and Technology:

- 1. Workers can be in one of two states: employed or unemployed, with value functions V_E , V_U .
- 2. Firms post wage-*contracts*: distribution of *promised values*, $V \sim F(.)$.
- 3. Workers receive job offers at exogenous rate λ .
- 4. Separate two ways: "exit the model" (rate δ) and via thru OTJS (rate $\lambda[1 F(V)]$)
- 5. Risk-aversion: u(c) = u(b) or u(c) = u(w).
- 6. Rate of time preference: r = 0 (simplification for analytical results).
- Firms cannot respond to outside offers.
- Instead, they increase wages over time to ensure that a worker does not leave early.

Contracts

- Rather than wages, a firm offers a promised value, and can distribute it in any way over the life of the contract.
- Optimally, they want to backload the contract.
- Why? Because workers are less likely to leave if continuation value is high.
- Wage-tenure contracts:
 - 1. Wage $w(.) \ge 0$.
 - 2. Where tenure, *t*, is its only argument.
 - 3. By assumption, equilibrium is symmetric, i.e., all contracts are the same given *t*.

Worker Value Functions

• Unemployed flow value (bc r = 0):

$$\delta V_U = u(b) + \lambda \int_{V_U}^{\bar{V}} [x - V_U] dF(x)$$
(11)

Employed value function

$$\delta V_{E}(t|w(.)) - \frac{dV_{E}(t|w(.))}{dt} = u(w(t)) + \lambda \int_{V_{E}(t|w(.))}^{\bar{V}} [V_{x} - V_{E}(t|w(.))] dF(V_{x})$$
(12)

Firm Value Functions

Define a worker survival probability (i.e., doesn't leave or die.) through tenure t.

$$\psi(t|w(.)) = e^{-\int_0^t [\delta + \lambda(1 - F(V(s|w(.))))]ds}$$
(13)

Define G(V) the steady state number of workers with lifetime utility less than V.

Then,

$$\Omega = \underbrace{[\lambda G(V_0)]}_{Finding \ Rate} \int_0^\infty \underbrace{\psi(t|w(.))}_{Survival} \underbrace{[p - w(t)]}_{Flow \ profits} dt$$
(14)

Where Ω is the equilibrium profits of a firm posting contract w(.) s.t., E[u(w(.))] = V₀.

Optimal Contract

- Fundamental question: Why do we write contracts?
- Firm dynamic programming problem

$$\max_{w(.)\geq 0} \int_0^\infty \psi(t|w(.))[p-w(t)]dt$$
(15)

What are the two terms here?

$$\max_{w(.)\geq 0} \int_{0}^{\infty} (\underbrace{\psi(t|w(.))p}_{Gains} - \underbrace{\psi(t|w(.))w(t)}_{Losses}) dt \qquad (16)$$

$$\Omega^*(V_0) = \lambda G(V_0) \pi^*(0|V_0)$$
(17)

Equilibrium

Assumptions:

- 1. Convex preferences: u, > 0, u'' < 0 and exists, and $\lim_{c \leftarrow 0} u(c) = -\infty$
- 2. $\forall V_0 \in (\underline{V}, \overline{V}), F$ is continuously diff'ble & $F'(V_0) > 0$.

From the paper: A market equilibrium is:

- 1. a distribution of starting payoffs F.
- 2. Optimal wage-tenure contracts $w^*(.|V_0), V_0 \ge V_U$.
- 3. Optimal stopping-time solutions to both worker problems.
- 4. Worker value distribution G consistent with worker flows.
- 5. Optimal posting game:

$$\Omega^*(V_0) = \bar{\Omega} \forall V_0 \in [\underline{V}, \bar{V}]$$
(18)

$$\Omega^*(V_0) \leq \bar{\Omega}$$
 otherwise (19)

Optimal Contract

- Fundamental question: Why do we write contracts?
- Firm dynamic programming problem

$$\max_{w(.)\geq 0} \int_0^\infty \psi(t|w(.))[p-w(t)]dt$$
(20)

s.t.
$$w(.) \ge 0$$
 (21)

$$V(0|w(.)) = V_0$$
 (22)

Continuous-time optimization (Hamiltonian) where

$$\dot{\psi} = -[\delta + \lambda(1 - F(V))]\psi$$
 (23)

$$\dot{V} = \delta V - u(w) - \lambda \int_{V}^{\bar{V}} [x - V] dF(x)$$
(24)



$$H = \psi[p - w] + x_{\psi}\dot{\psi} + x_{V}\dot{V}$$
(25)

Optimal path of the wage would solve this problem.

Optimal Contract

Solving the contracting problem yields the following contract: $\frac{u'(w^*(0|.))}{u'(w^*(\tau|.))} = 1 + u'(w^*(0|.)) \int_0^\tau \lambda F'(V^*(t|.))\pi^*(t|.)dt$ (26)

Strictly increasing and concave utility:

$$\frac{u'(w^*(0|.))}{u'(w^*(\tau|.))} > 1 \to w^*(\tau) > w^*(0)$$
(27)

Increasing wage at time τ decreases quit rate over [0, τ]:

$$\underbrace{u'(w^*(0|.))}_{Slope} \int_0^\tau \underbrace{\lambda F'(V^*(t|.))}_{\Delta \text{ Quit Rate}} \underbrace{\pi^*(t|.)}_{PDV \text{ of Profits}} dt \qquad (28)$$

Moral hazard: reward those who do not quit.

Market Equilibrium

Similar to the BM model (but with more algebra), can show that there exists a unique equilibrium, with the following:

$$(\frac{\delta}{\lambda+\delta})^2 = \frac{p-\bar{w}}{p-\underline{w}}$$
(29)
$$u(\underline{w}) = u(b) - \frac{\sqrt{p-\underline{w}}}{2} \int_{\underline{w}}^{\bar{w}} \frac{u'(x)dx}{\sqrt{p-x}}$$
(30)

With a wage-tenure contract given by

$$\frac{dw}{dt} = \frac{\delta}{\sqrt{p - \bar{w}}} \frac{p - w}{u'(w)} \int_{w}^{\bar{w}} \frac{u'(x)dx}{\sqrt{p - x}}$$
(31)

Market Equilibrium

 Pins down initial wage & thus contract. (Burdett and Coles, 2003)




FIGURE 1.

Risk Aversion

- We breezed through preferences earlier.
- What role does consumption risk play here?
 - 1. Way to give workers a preference over when they receive consumption.
 - 2. Opportunity for firm to provide insurance against shocks.
- They use different CRRA thresholds: (Burdett and Coles, 2003)

σ	\underline{w}	\overline{w}	$F_w(\underline{w})$
0.0	0.600	4.964	1.000
0.1	1.333	4.970	0.911
0.2	1.751	4.973	0.864
0.4	2.223	4.977	0.803
0.8	2.728	4.981	0.727
1.4	3.126	4.985	0.657
∞	4.600	4.997	0.000

TABLE I

Consumption Risk

What is strange about this table? (Burdett and Coles, 2003)

$\overline{\sigma}$	\underline{w}	\overline{w}	$F_w(\underline{w})$
0.0	0.600	4.964	1.000
0.1	1.333	4.970	0.911
0.2	1.751	4.973	0.864
0.4	2.223	4.977	0.803
0.8	2.728	4.981	0.727
1.4	3.126	4.985	0.657
∞	4.600	4.997	0.000

TABLE I

- There was no precautionary savings here.
- i.e., firms attracted workers by offering *insurance* against low consumption via a guaranteed contract.
- But, transitory consumption risk already mitigated by autarky and UI.

Next Time

- Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002): Sequential auctions (i.e., firm can respond to outside offers)
- Next Wednesday, introduction/research proposal due.
- Presentations the following Monday.
- Start your data projects soon!