

Macro II

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Announcements

- ▶ Today: Start heterogeneous agent models.
- ▶ First: income fluctuation problem.
- ▶ New homework uploaded on Wednesday.

Thinking about Uncertainty in Macroeconomic Models

- ▶ Uncertainty makes macroeconomic models more difficult to solve.
- ▶ We make assumptions about the environment (preferences, technology, etc.) to decrease complexity of problem.
- ▶ Euler Equation:

$$u'(c_t) = \beta E[\underbrace{(1 + r_{t+1})}_{GE} \underbrace{u'(c_{t+1})}_{Non-linear}] \quad (1)$$

- ▶ Each agent chooses consumption and savings based on a
 1. general equilibrium object (given by the decision rules of all other agents)
 2. (potentially highly) non-linear marginal utility.

Thinking about Uncertainty in Macroeconomic Models

- ▶ Market clearing:

$$\sum_{i=1}^N ((1 + r_{t+1})a_{i,t+1} + w_{i,t+1} - c_{i,t+1} - a_{i,t+2}) = 0 \quad (2)$$

- ▶ Wealth + Income - (Consumption + Savings) = 0
- ▶ Now we have to find decision rules that satisfy

$$u'(c_{i,t}) = \beta E[(1 + r_{t+1})u'(c_{i,t+1})] \quad (3)$$

- ▶ Imposing decision rules as a function of worker state ($\hat{S}_{i,t}$):

$$\sum_{i=1}^N ((1 + r_{t+1})a_{i,t+1}(\hat{S}_{i,t+1}) + w_{i,t+1}(\hat{S}_{i,t+1})) \quad (4)$$

$$- \sum_{i=1}^N (c_{i,t+1}(\hat{S}_{i,t+1}) - a_{i,t+2}(\hat{S}_{i,t+2})) = 0 \quad (5)$$

Thinking about Uncertainty in Macroeconomic Models

- ▶ Typical assumptions in macroeconomics are a convex combination of

1. certainty equivalence:

$$u'(\bar{c}_{i,t}) = \beta E \left[\underbrace{(1 + r_{t+1})}_{GE} \underbrace{u'(\bar{c}_{i,t+1})}_{\text{Closer to Linear}} \right] \quad (6)$$

2. linearized decision rules:

$$\sum_{i=1}^N ((1 + r_{t+1})a_{i,t+1} + w_{i,t+1} - c_{i,t+1} - a_{i,t+2}) = 0 \quad (7)$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^N ((1 + r_{t+1})\beta_a \hat{S}_{i,t+1} + \beta_w (\hat{S}_{i,t+1}) - \beta_c \hat{S}_{i,t+1} - \beta_a \hat{S}_{i,t+2}) = 0 \quad (8)$$

- ▶ Can be expressed as matrix & solved quickly on computer.

So far

- ▶ We've thought about worlds in which markets are complete:
 1. agents can share risk perfectly;
 2. contract on any feasible consumption stream ex-ante (Arrow-Debreu) or ex-post (sequential).
 3. implies representative agent.
- ▶ Today: a different route. Workers cannot insure against income uncertainty.
- ▶ Explore using different preferences:
 1. Certainty Equivalence - Quadratic Utility.
 2. Constant Absolute Risk Aversion - Exponential Utility.
 3. Constant Relative Risk Aversion.
- ▶ These each imply different ways in which agents respond to income shocks and uncertainty.

Risk

- ▶ How do we typically think about risk in economic models?
- ▶ Absolute Risk Aversion:

$$AR = -\frac{u''(c)}{u'(c)} \quad (9)$$


- ▶ A measure of the agent's risk aversion unconditional upon their level of wealth.
- ▶ Relative Risk Aversion:

$$RRA = -\frac{u''(c)c}{u'(c)} \quad (10)$$

- ▶ Conditioning upon an agent's wealth, how does his risk aversion change?
- ▶ Probably most reasonable are "DARA" "CRRA"
- ▶ These will have different implications for savings and consumption.

When approximations work

- ▶ For a lot of the distribution, decision rules are linear:



Introduction

- ▶ In the case of quadratic utility, we will see that agents don't change their consumption choices when faced with shocks.
- ▶ Uncertainty still decreases expected utility, but does not change choices.
- ▶ Why is this relevant? One solution technique (LQ) assumes that agents have a quadratic utility function (locally risk-neutral).
- ▶ We will see that this is sometimes not a great assumption.

Quadratic Utility

- Utility is given by the following:

$$\max E\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (aC_t - bC_t^2)\right] \quad (11)$$

$$\text{s.t. } A_{t+1} = (1+r)A_t + Y_t - C_t \quad (12)$$

$$Y_{t+1} = \rho Y_t + \epsilon_{t+1} \quad (13)$$

Euler Equation

- ▶ Do the usual steps to find the Euler Equation:

$$V(A) = \max_{C, A'} aC_t - bC_t^2 + \beta E[V(A')] \quad (14)$$

$$\text{s.t. } A' = (1 + r)A + Y - C \quad (15)$$

$$Y' = \rho Y + \epsilon' \quad (16)$$

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial C} = a - 2bC - \lambda \quad (17)$$

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial A'} = -\lambda + \beta E\left[\frac{\partial V}{\partial A'}\right] \quad (18)$$

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial A} = (1 + r)\lambda \quad (19)$$

$$\Rightarrow C = \beta(1 + r)E[C'] \quad (20)$$

Certainty Equivalence

- ▶ Suppose that $\beta = (1 + r)$:

$$C = E[C'] \quad (21)$$

- ▶ Suppose that there were two states of the world: high and low.

$$C = P_h C_h + P_l C_l \quad (22)$$

- ▶ This is equivalent to an agent receiving the mean income between both states:

$$C = C_m \quad (23)$$

- ▶ i.e., workers make savings decisions *as though they are receiving the average consumption with certainty.*

Prudence

- ▶ Agents in this economy are not “prudential.”
- ▶ That is, they don’t change their choices based upon uncertainty about the future.
- ▶ Another way to express this is in the third derivative of the utility function:

$$U''' = 0 \tag{24}$$

- ▶ This captures the response of marginal utility (i.e., decisions) to uncertainty.
- ▶ Marginal utility changes linearly, so any convex combination is equal to the expected value.

Random Walk

- ▶ Can show for the AR(1) case:

$$C_t - C_{t-1} = \frac{r}{1 + r - \rho} \epsilon \quad (25)$$

- ▶ Now, consider the case in which income shocks are iid:

$$Y_{t+1} = Y_t + \epsilon_{t+1} \quad (26)$$

- ▶ Then the difference in consumption becomes:

$$C_t - C_{t-1} = \epsilon_t \quad (27)$$

- ▶ In other words, the agent consumes all of the shock in each period (will also happen with CRRA and autarky).

Conclusion

- ▶ In the quadratic utility world, uncertainty does not change an agents decision when compared with an identical income stream.
- ▶ In the case of CARA utility, we will see that agents have precautionary savings that result from curvature in the utility function.
- ▶ The choices are the same as they would be under complete markets.

Introduction

- ▶ Now, use CARA preferences to think about world in which certainty equivalence does not hold.
- ▶ Now, we will allow agents to be prudential in their savings response to future uncertainty.

Constant Absolute Risk Aversion Utility

- ▶ The maximization problem is given by

$$\max E\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} -\frac{1}{\alpha} \exp(-\alpha C_t)\right] \quad (28)$$

$$\text{s.t. } A_{t+1} = A_t + Y_t - C_t \quad (29)$$

$$Y_t = Y_{t_1} + \epsilon_t, \epsilon_t \sim N(0, \sigma^2) \quad (30)$$

- ▶ Key difference: first derivative (i.e., policy functions), no longer linear.

Euler Equation

- ▶ Bellman Equation (implicitly assume $\beta = (1 + r)$):

$$V(A) = \max_{C, A'} -\left(\frac{1}{\alpha}\right) \exp(-\alpha C) + E[V(A')] \quad (31)$$

$$\text{s.t. } A' = A + Y - C \quad (32)$$

$$Y' = Y + \epsilon' \quad (33)$$

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial C} = \exp(-\alpha C) - \lambda \quad (34)$$

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial A'} = -\lambda + E\left[\frac{\partial V}{\partial A'}\right] \quad (35)$$

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial A} = \lambda \quad (36)$$

$$\Rightarrow \exp(-\alpha C) = E[\exp(-\alpha C')] \quad (37)$$

Euler Equation

- ▶ Bellman Equation (implicitly assume $\beta = (1 + r)$):

$$\exp(-\alpha C) = E[\exp(-\alpha C')] \quad (38)$$

- ▶ For normally distributed random variables, the following holds:

$$E[\exp(x)] = \exp(E[x] + \sigma_x^2/2) \quad (39)$$

- ▶ Thus, we can rewrite the Euler Equation as

$$\exp(-\alpha C) = E(\exp(-\alpha C' + \alpha^2 \sigma^2/2)) \quad (40)$$

$$\Rightarrow C' = C + \frac{\alpha \sigma^2}{2} + \nu \quad (41)$$

Policy Function

- ▶ Policy function:

$$\Rightarrow C' = C + \frac{\alpha\sigma^2}{2} + \nu \quad (42)$$

- ▶ This says that consumption is *increasing* ex-ante in response to uncertainty, measured by σ^2 .
- ▶ What does this mean about life-cycle consumption?
- ▶ We would expect it to be upward-sloping, at least initially.

Consumption in time t

- ▶ Can show:

$$C_t = \left(\frac{1}{T-t}\right)A_t + Y_t - \frac{\alpha(T-t-1)\sigma^2}{4} \quad (43)$$

- ▶ Certainty equivalence: last term is equal to zero. i.e., cake-eating problem.
- ▶ Agents consume less than they would if their income stream was certain!

Prudence

- ▶ What is different in this case?
- ▶ Agents are prudential: $U''' > 0$.
- ▶ The Euler Equation is given by:

$$\exp(-\alpha C) = E[\exp(-\alpha C')] \quad (44)$$

- ▶ Suppose $C = C'$, then consider Jensen's Inequality:

$$\exp(-\alpha E(C)) < E[\exp(-\alpha C)] \quad (45)$$

- ▶ This needs to hold in equilibrium, thus agents must decrease current consumption.
- ▶ Agents save in excess of what they would under certainty!

CARA Utility

- ▶ When CARA agents cannot perfectly insure, they change their choices from the certainty equivalence (quadratic utility) case.
- ▶ Unfortunately, CARA has some problems: Marginal utility is finite when consumption is equal to zero.
- ▶ CRRA utility will solve this problem, but is more challenging to solve.

CRRA Preferences

- ▶ Now, we will start to think about an economy in which agents have **C**onstant **R**elative **R**isk **A**verse preferences.
- ▶ i.e., power utility.
- ▶ What else does this mean? Key difference:
- ▶ Agents are very unhappy when they starve:

$$u'(0) = \infty \quad (46)$$

- ▶ Seems like a reasonable assumption.
- ▶ Cover this in heterogeneous agent models next time.

Next time

- ▶ First wave of heterogeneous agent models: how do aggregates change when *individual idiosyncratic* uncertainty is uninsurable.
- ▶ In other words: when agents must accumulate *precautionary savings* to insure against income shocks.
- ▶ Key “first wave” papers (no particular order):
 - ▶ Huggett (1993): Incomplete markets exchange economy with GE interest rate.
 - ▶ Imrohorglu (1989): Individual and aggregate uncertainty with fixed interest rate.
 - ▶ Aiyagari (1994): Incomplete markets production economy with GE interest rate.
 - ▶ Bewley (1986): Individual uncertainty with fixed interest rate.
- ▶ Start this on Wednesday, talk about how to solve them next Monday.