Macro II

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Announcements

Today:

- 1. Random vs. directed search
- 2. Change primitive: workers can observe wage offers prior to match.
- 3. i.e., Moen (1997)
- Homework due on Wednesday.
- Final: 24 hours starting Friday at 9am.
- ▶ 3 questions, any part of course is fair game.

Random vs. Directed Search

- How do workers find jobs?
- How much information do they have about a job before applying?
- Two extremes:
 - 1. Random Search: *no* information about a job prior to receiving offer.
 - 2. Directed Search: *all* information about a job prior to application.
- Why does this matter?
 - 1. Random search is generically inefficient: one worker may reject a job offer than another would accept.
 - 2. Directed search is generically efficient: by applying for a job, a worker signals that the job is already acceptable.
- As we will see next time, it also changes computational complexity.

Random vs. Directed Search II

- Empirically, how can we tell them apart?
- Hazard rate to wage w generically:

$$H_{U}(w) = \underbrace{\lambda(w)}_{Arrival \ Rate} \times \underbrace{f(w)}_{Prob. Offer = W}$$
(1)

Random search:

$$H_{U}(w) = \underbrace{\lambda}_{Arrival \ Rate} \underbrace{[1 - F(w_{R})]}_{Selectivity} \underbrace{f(w)}_{P.(Offer = W)}$$
(2)

Directed search:

$$H_{U}(w) = \underbrace{\lambda(w)}_{Arrival} \underbrace{\left[1 - F(w_{\overline{R}})\right]}_{F(w_{R})=0} \underbrace{f(w)}_{P(Offer = w)}$$
(3)
$$= \underbrace{\lambda(W)}_{Arrival} \underbrace{f(w)}_{P(w=w_{j})=1}$$
(4)
$$= \underbrace{\lambda(w)}_{(5)} \underbrace{f(w)}_{(5)}$$
(5)

Arrival Rate of Wage w

Some Evidence

- (First couple Borrowed from Shouyong Shi)
- ► Hall and Krueger (08):
 - 1. 84% had information on wage prior to first interview.
- Holzer, Katz, and Krueger (91)
 - 1. Firms in high-wage industries receive more applications than low-wage industries, controlling for observables.
- Braun, Engelhardt, Griffy, and Rupert: unemployment insurance changes λ(w) → inconsistent with random search.

Mortensen and Pissarides Model

Unemployed flow value:

$$rU = b + p(\theta)E[W(w) - U]$$
(6)

Employed flow value:

$$rW(w) = w + \delta[U - W(w)]$$
(7)

Vacant flow value:

$$rV = -\kappa + q(\theta)E[J(w) - V]$$
(8)

Matched flow value:

$$rJ(w) = (p - w) + \delta[V - J(w)]$$
(9)

Free entry equilibrium condition:

$$V = 0 \tag{10}$$

$$\rightarrow \frac{\kappa}{E[J(w)]} = q(\theta) \tag{11}$$


Equilibrium

- The equilibrium we have described is a steady-state equilibrium characterized by value functions U, W, J, V, a wage function w, a market tightness function θ, and steady-state level unemployment u, such that
 - 1. A steady-state level of unemployment, derived from the flow unemployment equation.
 - 2. A wage rule that splits the surplus of a match according to a sharing rule with bargaining weight β
 - 3. A free entry condition that determines θ given wages and steady-state unemployment.
- What were these policy functions?

1.
$$w = (1 - \beta)b + \beta p + \beta \theta \kappa$$

2. $\theta = q^{-1}(\frac{\kappa(r+\delta)}{(p-w)})$
3. $u = \frac{\delta}{\delta + p(\theta)}$

Equilibrium



Directed/Competitive Search

- ► In DMP, wages are negotiated/revealed after meeting.
- This can create inefficiency:
 - 1. Consider example with unemployed workers A and B.

2.
$$w_R^A = 10, w_R^B = 15$$

- 3. Firm pays a cost κ to open a vacancy and posts a wage 12.
- 4. Both worker A and B apply for the job. Firm randomly picks worker B.
- 5. Worker B rejects job that would have been acceptable to worker A.
- ► Directed search: Worker B applies for different job with w ≥ w^B_R.
- (Directed and competitive search generally used interchangeably).

The Competitive Search Model (Moen, 1997)

Agents:

- 1. Employed workers employed in submarket *i*;
- 2. unemployed workers considering searching in $i \in \{1, ..., N\}$;
- 3. unmatched firms indexed by productivity $y_i \in y_1, ..., y_N$;
- 4. matched firms indexed by productivity $y_i \in y_1, ..., y_N$;
- 5. "Market Maker": benevolent overlord who announces eqm. w_i .
- Linearity: $(u = z, u = w_i)$ and $y = y_i > z$ in open submarkets.
- Matching function:
 - 1. Determines *number* of meetings between firms & workers in submarket *i*:

$$M(u_iL_i, v_iL_i) = u_iL_i \times M(1, \frac{v_i}{u_i}) = u_iL_i \times p(\theta_i)$$
(12)

2. where $\theta_i = \frac{v_i}{u_i}$ is "submarket tightness" 3. Match rates:

$$\underbrace{p(\theta_i)}_{Worker wage i} = \theta_i \underbrace{q(\theta_i)}_{Firm wage i}$$
(13)

• *i* indexes both the productivity and wage.

Worker Value Functions

- Value functions:
 - 1. Employed in submarket *i*: W_i
 - 2. Unemployed and searching in submarket *i*: U_i .
 - 3. Unemployed: $U = \max\{U_1, ..., U_N\}$.

Unemployed flow value in submarket i:

$$rU_i = z + p(\theta_i)(W_i - U_i)$$
(14)

Employed flow value in submarket i:

$$rW_i = w_i + \delta(U_i - W_i) \tag{15}$$

▶ Both problems are stationary: optimal choice of *i* true \forall *t*.

Worker Value Functions II

We can solve for match rates:

$$rU_i = z + p(heta_i)(W_i - U_i)$$
 (16)
 $(r + p(heta_i))U_i = z + p(heta_i)rac{w_i + \delta U_i}{r + \delta}$ (17)

$$(r+\delta)(r+p(\theta_i))U_i - p(\theta_i)\delta U_i = (r+\delta)z + p(\theta_i)w_i \quad (18)$$

$$rU_i = \frac{(r+\delta)z + p(\theta_i)w_i}{(r+\delta + p(\theta_i))} \quad (19)$$

$$p(\theta_i) = \frac{rU_i - z}{w_i - rU_i}(r + \delta) \qquad (20)$$

(21)

(23)

► U = max{U₁,...,U_N} and ex-ante homogeneity among workers implies

$$p(\theta_i) = \frac{rU - z}{w_i - rU}(r + \delta)$$
(22)

Firm Value Functions

- Pays a cost χ to draw productivity.
- Firm observes own productivity, chooses to open vacancy given submarkets (w, θ).
- Value functions:
 - 1. Vacant with productivity y_i : $V(y_i, w, \theta)$
 - 2. Filled with productivity y_i , paying wage w: $J(y_i, w)$
- Vacant flow value:

$$rV(y_i, w, \theta) = -\kappa + q(\theta)(J(y_i, w) - V(y_i, w, \theta))$$
(24)

Matched flow value:

$$rJ(y_i,w) = y_i - w + \delta(V(y_i,w,\theta) - J(y_i,w))$$
(25)

Firm Value Functions II

Value functions:

- 1. Vacant with productivity y_i : $V(y_i, w, \theta)$
- 2. Filled with productivity y_i , paying wage w: $J(y_i, w)$

• In equilibrium $V(y_i, w, \theta) = 0$:

$$rJ(y_i, w) = y_i - w - \delta J(y_i, w)$$
(26)

• Asset value of vacancy in submarket (y_i, w, θ) :

$$(r+q(\theta))V(y_i,w,\theta) = q(\theta)\frac{y_i-w}{r+\delta} - \kappa$$
 (27)

Equilibrium

- We will be interested in the same equilibrium objects, but now for each submarket i:
 - 1. Wages w_i;
 - 2. unemployment *u_i*;
 - 3. $\theta_i = \frac{v_i}{u_i}$ vacancies in each submarket.
- Before, 1 & 3 were separate equilibrium conditions.
- New equilibrium objects
 - 1. set of open submarkets, \mathcal{I} ;
 - 2. value of unemployment $\overline{V}(U)$
- Market maker sets wages according to

$$\max_{w} V(y_i, w, \theta(w; U))$$
(28)

Given p(θ) from worker's problem, find w that maximizes value of vacancy.

Free Entry

- Free entry implies that the expected value of opening a vacancy will be equal to the cost of opening it \(\chi\)
- The expected value of opening a vacancy

$$\bar{V}(U) = \sum_{i=\iota(U)}^{n} f_i V(y_i, w_i^*(U), \theta_i^*(U))$$

equilibrium:

$$\bar{V}(U) = \kappa$$

Equilibrium Number of Markets

We know that each productivity will form a separate market


There are n productivities in the distribution

• All submarkets such that $w_i \ge rU$ will remain open

• Let ι denote the lowest submarket open


"Competitive" Search

What is shaded region?



"Competitive" Search

Inefficiency (rejected matches in DMP)



Equilibrium

 The resulting competitive equilibrium with frictional labor markets is characterized by the following equations

$$\bar{V}(U) = \chi \tag{29}$$

$$w_i = \arg\max V(y_i, w, \theta(w; U)), i \ge i_R$$
(30)

$$rU_i = \frac{(r+\delta)z + p(\theta_i)w_i}{(r+\delta + p(\theta_i))}, i \ge i_R$$
(31)

$$\dot{u}_i = 0; u_i p(\theta_i) = e_i \delta$$
 (32)

$$\sum_{i} u_{i} = u \tag{33}$$

What is "valuable" about directed search?

- Submarkets are individually priced.
- ► i.e., contracts (w, θ) are known given the state of the worker and firm.
- Then, assuming that free entry binds in every open submarket, no longer need to condition on aggregate distributions as state variables (Menzio and Shi, 2011).
- So models are computationally tractable.
- Makes it possible to easily incorporate heterogeneity.

Conclusion

- Thank you for a good semester!
- Hope everyone has a good summer and please come visit once we can all be in person.
- Final on Friday, 24 hours to take exam, 3 hours to complete once started.
- ► 3 questions, anything is fair game.