Macro II

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Spring 2023

Introduction

- ► Today: Asset pricing
- ► The "Lucas Tree Model."
- Homework due Thursday.
- ► Test next Thursday (I think...)
- ▶ I will be out of town on Thursday.
- ▶ New homework sometime soon...

Rational Expectations Competitive Equilibrium

Definition: Given the set of exogenous stochastic processes $\{x_t\}$, and initial conditions a_0 , a rational expectations equilibrium is a set of stochastic processes for prices $\{p_t\}$ and quantities $\{q_t\}$ such that:

- ▶ Given $\{p_t\}$, $\{q_t\}$ is consistent with optimal behavior on the part of consumers, producers and (if relevant) the government.
- ▶ Given $\{p_t\}$, $\{q_t\}$ satisfies the government's budget constraints and borrowing restrictions.
- ▶ $\{p_t\}$ satisfies any market-clearing conditions.

Lucas Tree Overview

► We are given equilibrium quantities and equilibrium demand functions—back out equilibrium prices.

▶ We know the function D(p) and the quantity q_0 : now find p_0 .

Compare with Literature on Consumption

Consumption: Take rates of return as given, solve for consumption.

Asset Pricing: Take consumption as given, solve for rates of return.

Model Structure

▶ Preferences: *n* identical consumers, maximizing

$$E_{0}\left(\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\beta^{t}u\left(c_{t}\right)\right),$$

$$\beta\in\left(0,1\right),\quad u'\left(\cdot\right)>0,\quad u''\left(\cdot\right)\leq0.$$

- ► Endowment: one durable "tree" per individual. Each period, the tree yields some "fruit" ($d_t \equiv$ dividends).
- ▶ Technology: Fruit cannot be stored. Dividends are exogenous and follow a time-invariant Markov process

$$\Pr\left(\left.d_{t+1} \leq y\right| d_{t} = x\right) = F\left(y, x\right), \forall t,$$

with density f(y, x).

Solution strategy

► Find the competitive equilibrium allocation via the social planner's problem. Assume equal weights on each person's utility (parallel to equal endowments).

i.e., use welfare theorems.

Calculate the FOC for individuals with the opportunity to buy/sell specific assets.

Evaluate FOC at the competitive equilibrium allocation.

Step 1: Social planner's problem

Use a representative agent

Social planner solves

$$\max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} E_0\left(\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t)\right)$$
s.t. $c_t \leq d_t$.

- ▶ Solution: $c_t = d_t$, $\forall t \text{ (non-storable good!)}$.
- ▶ What does this mean?

Definitions

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c_t = {\sf consumption}, p_t = {\sf price} of a tree = price of stock, x_t = {\sf total} resources s_{t+1} = {\sf number} of trees/shares of stock, R_t = {\sf gross} return on one-period risk-free bond, R_t^{-1} = {\sf price} of a one-period, risk-free discount bond, b_{t+1} = {\sf risk}-free discount bonds.
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Step 2: Representative consumer's problem

$$\max_{\{c_t, b_{t+1}, s_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} E\left(\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) \middle| l_0\right)$$

$$s.t. \quad c_t + p_t s_{t+1} + R_t^{-1} b_{t+1} = x_t,$$

$$x_t = (p_t + d_t) s_t + b_t,$$

$$\lim_{J \to \infty} \beta^J E_t \left(u'(c_{t+J}) p_{t+J} s_{t+J+1}\right) = 0$$

$$\lim_{J \to \infty} \beta^J E_t \left(u'(c_{t+J}) b_{t+J+1}\right) = 0,$$

$$s_0, \ b_0 \text{ given}$$

ightharpoonup where I_0 is the information set at time 0.

Consumer's problem

► Consumer *i* picks c_t^i , b_{t+1}^i and s_{t+1}^i on the basis of

$$I_{t}^{i} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \left\{d_{t-m}, p_{t-m}, R_{t-m}\right\}_{m=0}^{t}, \\ \left\{s_{t+1-m}^{j}, b_{t+1-m}^{j}\right\}_{m=0}^{t+1}, \ \forall j \neq i, \\ \left\{c_{t-m}^{j}, x_{t-m}^{j}\right\}_{m=0}^{t}, \ \forall j \neq i, \\ \left\{s_{t-m}^{i}, b_{t-m}^{i}, x_{t-m}^{i}\right\}_{m=0}^{t}, \left\{c_{t-m}^{i}\right\}_{m=1}^{t}, \end{array} \right\},$$

- It turns out that d_t summarizes the state of the aggregate economy, with $p_t = p(d_t)$ and $R_t = R(d_t)$.
- lt is the only stochastic variable, and aggregate resources equal d_t .
- ▶ Because d_t is a time-invariant Markov process, the consumer's problem is time-invariant

Recursive formulation

Bellman's functional equation:

$$\begin{split} V(x_t, d_t) &= \\ & \min_{\lambda_t \geq 0} \max_{c_t \geq 0, \ s_{t+1}, \ b_{t+1}} u(c_t) + \lambda_t \left(x_t - c_t - p_t s_{t+1} - R_t^{-1} b_{t+1} \right) \\ &+ \beta \int V\left(\left(p\left(d_{t+1} \right) + d_{t+1} \right) s_{t+1} + b_{t+1}, d_{t+1} \right) dF\left(d_{t+1}, d_t \right). \end{split}$$

▶ The FOC for an interior solution are:

$$u'(c_t) = \lambda_t,$$

$$\lambda_t p_t = \beta \int \frac{\partial V[t+1]}{\partial x_{t+1}} (p(d_{t+1}) + d_{t+1}) dF(d_{t+1}, d_t),$$

$$\lambda_t R_t^{-1} = \beta \int \frac{\partial V[t+1]}{\partial x_{t+1}} dF(d_{t+1}, d_t).$$

Euler Equations

► Note that (by Benveniste-Scheinkman)

$$\frac{\partial V[t]}{\partial x_t} = \lambda_t,$$

so that

$$p_{t} = \beta E_{t} \left(\frac{u'(c_{t+1})}{u'(c_{t})} (p_{t+1} + d_{t+1}) \right),$$

$$R_{t}^{-1} = \beta E_{t} \left(\frac{u'(c_{t+1})}{u'(c_{t})} \right).$$

Step 3: Equilibrium

Intuition

 Agents allocate resources based on beliefs about future prices and consumption

These decision rules determine processes for market clearing prices and quantities.

▶ In a rational expectations equilibrium, the actual processes must be consistent with the beliefs.

▶ **Sequential** definition: Given the stochastic process $\{d_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ and the initial endowments $s_0 = 1$ and $b_0 = 0$, a rational expectations equilibrium consists of the stochastic processes $\{c_t, s_{t+1}, b_{t+1}, p_t, R_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ such that:

▶ Given the process for prices $\{p_t, R_t\}$, $\{c_t, s_{t+1}, b_{t+1}\}$ solves the consumer's problem.

All markets clear: $c_t = d_t$, $s_{t+1} = 1$, and $b_{t+1} = 0$, $\forall t$.

▶ **Recursive definition**: given the random variable d_0 , the conditional distribution $F\left(d_{t+1},d_t\right)$, and the initial endowments $s_0=1$ and $b_0=0$, a recursive rational expectations equilibrium consists of pricing functions $p\left(d\right)$ and $R\left(d\right)$, a value function $V\left(x,d\right)$, and decision functions $c\left(x,d\right)$, $s\left(x,d\right)$, and $b\left(x,d\right)$ such that:

- Given the pricing functions p(d) and R(d), the value and policy functions V(x,d), c(x,d), s(x,d), and b(x,d) solve the consumer's problem.
- Markets clear: for x = p(d) + d, c(x, d) = d, s(x, d) = 1, and b(x, d) = 0.

Backing out prices

Find $R(d_t)$: impose the equilibrium allocation, $c_t = d_t$, to get

$$R_t^{-1} = \beta E_t \left(\frac{u'(d_{t+1})}{u'(d_t)} \right)$$
$$= \beta \frac{1}{u'(d_t)} E_t \left(u'(d_{t+1}) \right). \tag{EE}$$

Find $p(d_t)$: impose the equilibrium allocation, $c_t = d_t$, to get

$$p_{t} = \beta E_{t} \left(\frac{u'(d_{t+1})}{u'(d_{t})} (p_{t+1} + d_{t+1}) \right).$$
 (EE')

Bond Price

► Recall equation (EE):

$$R_{t}^{-1} = \beta \frac{1}{u'(d_{t})} E_{t} \left(u'(d_{t+1}) \right), \tag{EE}$$

$$R_{t} = \frac{u'(d_{t})}{\beta E_{t} \left(u'(d_{t+1}) \right)}.$$

- ▶ The price of a discount bond increases (return falls) in β .
- The price increases (return falls) in expected future marginal utility, and decreases in current marginal utility: reflects consumption smoothing motive.
- Recall from last time: implies that more uncertainty raises bond price if convex preferences.

Stock prices

► Recall equation (EE'):

$$p_t = \beta E_t \left(\frac{u'(d_{t+1})}{u'(d_t)} (p_{t+1} + d_{t+1}) \right).$$
 (EE')

▶ Define the expected rate of return on stocks as

$$E_{t}\left(R_{t}^{s}\right)=E_{t}\left(\frac{p_{t+1}+d_{t+1}}{p_{t}}\right).$$

Equity premium

► The expected rate of return on stocks is

$$E_t(R_t^s) = E_t\left(\frac{p_{t+1} + d_{t+1}}{p_t}\right).$$

► Recall that

$$E_t(XY) = E_t(X) E_t(Y) + C_t(X, Y).$$

► Rewrite (EE'):

$$1 = \beta E_{t} \left(\frac{u'(d_{t+1})}{u'(d_{t})} \left(\frac{p_{t+1} + d_{t+1}}{p_{t}} \right) \right)$$

$$= \beta E_{t} \left(\frac{u'(d_{t+1})}{u'(d_{t})} R_{t}^{s} \right)$$

$$= \beta E_{t} \left(\frac{u'(d_{t+1})}{u'(d_{t})} \right) E_{t} \left(R_{t}^{s} \right) + C_{t} \left(\beta \frac{u'(d_{t+1})}{u'(d_{t})}, R_{t}^{s} \right)$$

Risk premium

► Insert (EE) and rearrange:

$$\begin{split} 1 &= R_{t}^{-1} E_{t} \left(R_{t}^{s} \right) + C_{t} \left(\beta \frac{u' \left(d_{t+1} \right)}{u' \left(d_{t} \right)}, R_{t}^{s} \right), \\ E_{t} \left(R_{t}^{s} \right) &= R_{t} - R_{t} C_{t} \left(\beta \frac{u' \left(d_{t+1} \right)}{u' \left(d_{t} \right)}, R_{t}^{s} \right), \\ &= R_{t} - \frac{u' \left(d_{t} \right)}{\beta E_{t} \left(u' \left(d_{t+1} \right) \right)} C_{t} \left(\beta \frac{u' \left(d_{t+1} \right)}{u' \left(d_{t} \right)}, R_{t}^{s} \right), \\ &= R_{t} - \frac{C_{t} \left(u' \left(d_{t+1} \right), R_{t}^{s} \right)}{E_{t} \left(u' \left(d_{t+1} \right) \right)}. \end{split}$$


► The expected return on stocks equals the return on the risk-free bond plus the <u>risk-premium</u>, which is $-\frac{C_t(\cdot,\cdot)}{E_t(\cdot)}$.

Equity premium: a puzzle?

- If the covariance $C_t(\cdot,\cdot)$ is negative, which we normally expect, there is an equity premium.
- Interpretation
 - ▶ The most desirable assets yield well when marginal utility is high $(C_t(\cdot, \cdot) > 0)$. Risk-aversion means that agents prefer assets that act like insurance.
 - Investors are willing to sacrifice return if $C_t(\cdot, \cdot) > 0$, and they will demand higher returns if $C_t(\cdot, \cdot) < 0$.
- ▶ Mehra and Prescott (1985): the observed equity premium is difficult to reconcile with this formula.

Equity premium: a puzzle?

▶ Mehra and Prescott (1985): the observed equity premium is difficult to reconcile with this formula.



Conclusion

► Homework due tonight.

Midterm next week.

▶ New homework posted soon, due a week after I post it.