Macro II

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Introduction

- Today: Market structure
- Complete markets:
 - Arrow-Debreu structure (time-0 contingent claims);
 - Arrow securities (sequentially traded one-period claims).
- Homework 3 due Thursday.
- ▶ No class Thursday (3/2).
- ▶ Midterm Thursday after Spring Break (3/23).

Complete markets

- Individuals in the economy have access to a comprehensive set of risk-sharing contracts:
 - They can contract to insure against any event or sequence of events.
 - ▶ They write these contracts with other agents in the economy.
- ▶ Will lead to
 - Perfect risk sharing
 - i.e., representative agent.

Complete markets

- Define unconditional probability of sequence of shocks $s^t = [s_0, s_1, ..., s_t]$ to be $\pi_t(s^t)$.
- Assume there are i = 1, ..., I consumers, each of whom receives a stochastic endowment $y_t^i(s^t)$.
- They purchase a consumption plan that stipulates consumption for any history of shocks and yields:

$$U_i(c^i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u_i [c_t^i(s^t)] \pi_t(s^t)$$

These contracts yield expected lifetime utility, where $\lim_{s\to 0} u_i'(c) = +\infty$

Complete markets

They purchase a consumption plan that stipulates consumption for any history of shocks and yields:

$$U_i(c^i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u_i [c_t^i(s^t)] \pi_t(s^t)$$


And are subject to a feasibility constraint:

$$\sum_{i} c_t^i(s^t) \leq \sum_{i} y_t^i(s^t) \ \forall \ t, \ s^t$$

- ▶ These contracts determine how to split resources at each t.
- i.e., they insure individuals ex-ante against income risk.

Contingent claims trading structure


Arrow-Debreu structure: contract at time t = 0 on every possible sequence of shocks.



- ► Each node represents a possible sequence of shocks.
- ➤ A consumption plan would specify consumption at each node at each time.

Sequential trading structure

Arrow securities: re-contract at ever t given the history of shocks s^t.



At t = 2, contract for two possible realizations.

Trading structure

- Arrow-Debreu structure: contract at time t = 0 on every possible sequence of shocks.
- Arrow securities: re-contract at ever t given the history of shocks s^t.
- ▶ Do these trading structure yield the same equilibrium allocation? Yes.
- Important property:
 - Under either structure, allocations are a function of the aggregate state only (& initial conditions).
 - ▶ i.e., allocation depends only on $\sum_{i=1}^{l} y_t^i(s^t)$
- Leads to representative agent structure.

Planner's Problem

- First, we will find the Pareto optimal allocation.
- ▶ i.e., the allocation from solving the Social Planner's problem:

$$\max_{c^i} W = \sum_{i=1}^I \lambda_i U_i(c^i)$$

- where λ_i is a "Pareto weight," i.e., how much Planner values individual i relative to others.
- Constrained maximization:

$$L = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \{ \sum_{i=1}^{I} \lambda_i \beta^t u_i(c_t^i) \pi_t(s^t) + \theta_t(s^t) \sum_{i=1}^{I} [y_t^i(s^t) - c_t^i(s^t)] \}$$

• i.e., maximize weighted expected utility subject to the feasibility constraint (multiplier θ)

Planner's Problem

Constrained maximization:

$$L = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \{ \sum_{i=1}^{I} \lambda_i \beta^t u_i(c_t^i) \pi_t(s^t) + \theta_t(s^t) \sum_{i=1}^{I} [y_t^i(s^t) - c_t^i(s^t)] \}$$

FOC in c_t^i :

$$\beta^t u_i'(c_t^i(s^t)) \pi_t(s^t) = \lambda_i^{-1} \theta_t(s^t)$$

How is this allocated across consumers?

$$\frac{u_i'(c_t^i(s^t))}{u_1'(c_t^1(s^t))} = \frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_i}
\to c_t^i(s^t) = u_i'^{-1}(\lambda_i^{-1}\lambda_1 u_1'(c_t^1(s^t)))$$

▶ Often, assume $\lambda_i = \lambda_1 \forall i \rightarrow c_t^i(s^t) = u_i'^{-1}(u_1'(c_t^1(s^t)))$

Planner's Problem

Allocation:

$$c_t^i(s^t) = u_i'^{-1}(\lambda_i^{-1}\lambda_1u_1'(c_t^1(s^t)))$$

Sub into resource constraint:

$$\sum_{i} u_{i}^{\prime - 1} (\lambda_{i}^{-1} \lambda_{1} u_{1}^{\prime} (c_{t}^{1}(s^{t}))) = \sum_{i} y_{t}^{i}(s^{t})$$

▶ i.e., the resource allocation depends only on aggregate endowment and weights of each consumer.

Decentralized allocations

We know that the optimal allocation is given by

$$\sum_{i} u_{i}'^{-1}(\lambda_{i}^{-1}\lambda_{1}u_{1}'(c_{t}^{1}(s^{t}))) = \sum_{i} y_{t}^{i}(s^{t})$$

Can we achieve the same allocation under different trading regimes?

Specifically, does the decentralized economy achieve the same allocation?

Consumer's problem

► Consumer's problem: maximize

$$U_i(c^i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u_i [c_t^i(s^t)] \pi_t(s^t)$$

subject to

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\sum_{s^t}q_t^0(s^t)c_t^i(s^t)\leq\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\sum_{s^t}q_t^0(s^t)y_t^i(s^t)$$

Consumer's problem

► Yields the following:

$$\beta^{t} u'_{i}[c_{t}^{i}(s^{t})] \pi_{t}(s^{t}) = \mu_{i} q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})$$
$$\frac{u'_{i}(c_{t}^{i}(s^{t}))}{u'_{1}(c_{t}^{1}(s^{t}))} = \frac{\mu_{i}}{\mu_{1}}$$

which implies

$$\sum_i u_i'^{-1}(\mu_1^{-1}\mu_i u_1'(c_t^1(s^t))) = \sum_i y_t^i(s^t)$$

Competitive Equilibrium

Definition A competitive equilibrium is a price system $\{q_t^0(s^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ and allocation $\{c^{i*}\}_{i\in\mathcal{I}}$ such that

1. Given a price system, each individual $i \in \mathcal{I}$ solves the following problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \{c_t^{i*}(s^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty} &= \arg\max_{\{c_t^{i}(s^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u\Big(c_t^{i}(s^t)\Big) \pi_t(s^t) \\ & \text{s.t.} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} q_t^0(s^t) c_t^{i}(s^t) \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} q_t^0(s^t) y_t^{i}(s^t) \end{aligned}$$

2. On every history s^t at time t, market clears

$$\sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}}c_t^{i*}(s^t)=\sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}}y_t^i(s^t)$$

Rules out economies with externalities, incomplete markets, etc.

First Welfare Theorem

► First welfare theorem: Let c be a competitive equilibrium allocation. Then c is pareto efficient.

▶ Equivalence: Competitive equilibrium is a specific Pareto optimal allocation in which $\lambda_i = \mu_i^{-1}$.

Sequential trading

- Now, we will consider an economy with sequential trades.
- ▶ i.e., each period agents meet and trade state-contingent bonds
- Recall from asset pricing:

$$p_{t} = \beta E_{t} \left(\frac{u'(d_{t+1})}{u'(d_{t})} (p_{t+1} + d_{t+1}) \right)$$

- where the expectation is over realizations of s_{t+1} , which determines d_{t+1} .
- Price is determined by payout of asset across all different realizations.
- i.e., asset that provides good return across all realizations: expensive.

Market clearing

- Recall from asset pricing that the net bond position of the economy equaled zero.
- i.e., $\sum_{i} b_{t+1}^{i} = 0$.
- Same in this context.
- Some are borrowing and some are saving (in principle, if there were heterogeneity).
- This must net to zero.

Restriction: No Ponzi Schemes

Must ensure that agents never take out too much debt.

Natural debt limit:

$$A_t^i(s^t) = \sum_{ au=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^ au \mid s^t} q_ au^t(s^ au) y_ au^i(s^ au)$$

This is the amount that the agent could borrow and still commit to repay.

Rules out Ponzi schemes.

Sequential problem

Consumer's problem: maximize

$$U_i(c^i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u_i [c_t^i(s^t)] \pi_t(s^t)$$

subject to

$$egin{aligned} c_t^i + \sum_{s^{t+1}} Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) a_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1},s^t) & \leq y_t^i(s^t) + a_t^i(s^t) \ - a_{t+1}^i(s^{t+1}) & \geq - A_{t+1}^i(s^{t+1}) \end{aligned}$$

where Q_t is a pricing kernel: price of one unit of consumption given realization s_{t+1} and history s^t .

Sequential allocation

Solving the previous problem yields the following Euler Equation:

$$Q_{t}(s_{t+1}|s^{t}) = \beta \left(\frac{u'(c_{t+1}^{i}(s^{t+1}))}{u'(c_{t}^{i}(s^{t}))} \pi_{t}(s^{t+1}|s^{t}) \right)$$

▶ Same as the asset pricing specification from earlier.

▶ Taking the expectation of this expression across all possible realizations of s^{t+1} yields the price, Q.

Sequential Trading - Competitive Equilibrium

Definition A competitive equilibrium is a price system $\left\{ \left\{Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t)\right\}_{s_{t+1} \in S}\right\}_{t=0}^{\infty}, \text{ an allocation} \\ \left\{ \left\{\tilde{c}_t^i(s^t), \; \left\{\tilde{a}_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1}, s^t)\right\}_{s_{t+1} \in S}\right\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \right\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}}, \text{ an initial distribution of wealth} \\ \left\{a_0^i(s_0) = 0\right\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}}, \text{ and a collection of natural borrowing limits} \\ \left\{ \left\{A_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1}, s^t)\right\}_{s_{t+1} \in S}\right\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \right\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \text{ such that}$

- 1. Given a price system, an initial distribution of wealth, and a collection of natural borrowing limits, each individual $i \in \mathcal{I}$ solves the workers problem.
- 2. On every history s^t at time t, markets clear.

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} c_t^i(s^t) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} y_t^i(s^t) \qquad \text{(Commodity market clearing)}$$

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} a_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1}, s^t) = 0 \forall \ s_{t+1} \in S \qquad \text{(Asset market clearing)}$$

Equivalence of allocations

- Is this allocation also a time-0 trading allocation?
- Yes. Suppose that the pricing kernel takes the following form

$$egin{aligned} q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1}) &= Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t)q_t^0(s^t) \ rac{q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1})}{q_t^0(s^t)} &= Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ That is, the price of 1 unit of consumption in period t+1 is the same regardless of whether you purchased that consumption last period or in period 0.
- ▶ When this holds, sequential allocation coincides with time-0 trading allocation, subject to initial distribution.
- ► Formal proof (check on your own): ► formal proof

Conclusion

▶ Midterm Thursday after break (3/21).

► HW4 between now and then.

Equivalence of allocations

$$Q_{t}(s_{t+1}|s^{t}) = \frac{q_{t+1}^{0}(s^{t+1})}{q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})} \Rightarrow \beta \frac{u'\left(\tilde{c}_{t+1}^{i}(s^{t+1})\right)}{u'\left(\tilde{c}_{t}^{i}(s^{t})\right)} \pi_{t}(s^{t+1}|s^{t})$$
$$= \beta \frac{u'\left(c_{t+1}^{i*}(s^{t+1})\right)}{u'\left(c_{t}^{i*}(s^{t})\right)} \pi_{t}(s^{t+1}|s^{t})$$

◆ back

Guess for portfolio

On every history s^t at time t,

$$\widetilde{a}_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1},s^t) = \sum_{ au=t+1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^ au \mid (s_{t+1},s^t)} rac{q_ au^0(s^ au)}{q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1})} \Big(c_ au^{i*}(s^ au) - y_ au^i(s^ au) \Big) orall \; s_{t+1} \in S_{t+1}^i(s^ au)$$

Value of this portfolio expressed in terms of the date t, history s^t consumption good is $\sum_{s_{t+1} \in S} \tilde{a}_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1}, s^t) Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) =$

$$\begin{split} &= \sum_{s_{t+1} \in S} \sum_{\tau = t+1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau} | (s_{t+1}, s^t)} \frac{q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1})} \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_t^i(s^{\tau}) \Big) Q_t(s_{t+1} | s^t) \\ &= \sum_{s_{t+1} \in S} \sum_{\tau = t+1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau} | (s_{t+1}, s^t)} \frac{q_{t+1}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1})} \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_t^i(s^{\tau}) \Big) \frac{q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1})}{q_t^0(s^t)} \\ &= \sum_{\tau = t+1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau} | s^t} \frac{q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_t^0(s^t)} \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_t^i(s^{\tau}) \Big) \end{split}$$

Verify portfolio

On history
$$s^0 = s_0$$
 at time $t = 0$, assume that $a_0^i(s_0) = 0$. Then
$$\tilde{c}_0^i(s_0) + \sum_{s_1 \in S} \tilde{a}_1^i(s_1, s_0) Q_1(s_1|s_0) = y_0^i(s_0) + 0$$

$$\tilde{c}_0^i(s_0) + \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s_0} \frac{q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_0^0(s_0)} \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_t^i(s^{\tau}) \Big) = y_0^i(s_0) + 0$$

$$q_0^0(s_0) c_0^{i*}(s_0) + \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s_0} q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau}) \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_t^i(s^{\tau}) \Big) = q_0^0(s_0) y_0^i(s_0)$$

$$(\text{if } \tilde{c}_0^i(s_0) = c_0^{i*}(s_0))$$

$$\sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s_0} q_t^0(s^t) y_t^i(s^t) = \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s_0} q_t^0(s^t) c_t^{i*}(s^t)$$

Therefore, given $\tilde{c}_0^i(s_0) = c_0^{i*}(s_0)$, portfolio $\{\tilde{a}_1^i(s_1,s_0)\}_{s_1 \in S}$ is affordable.

Verify portfolio

On history
$$s^t$$
 at time t , assume that
$$\tilde{a}_t^i(s^t) = \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^t} \frac{q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_{\tau}^0(s^t)} \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^i(s^{\tau}) \Big). \text{ Then }$$

$$\tilde{c}_t^i(s^t) + \sum_{s_{t+1} \in S} \tilde{a}_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1}, s^t) Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) = y_t^i(s^t)$$

$$+ \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^t} \frac{q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_{\tau}^0(s^t)} \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^i(s^{\tau}) \Big)$$

$$\tilde{c}_t^i(s^t) + \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^t} \frac{q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_{\tau}^0(s^t)} \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_t^i(s^{\tau}) \Big) = y_t^i(s^t)$$

$$+ \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^t} \frac{q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_{\tau}^0(s^t)} \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^i(s^{\tau}) \Big)$$

◆ back

Verify portfolio

On history s^t at time t, assume that

$$\tilde{a}_t^i(s^t) = \sum_{ au=t}^\infty \ \sum_{s^ au|s^t} rac{q_0^0(s^ au)}{q_0^0(s^t)} \Big(c_ au^{i*}(s^ au) - y_ au^i(s^ au) \Big).$$
 Then

$$\begin{split} q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})c_{t}^{i*}(s^{t}) + \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} q_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau}) \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{t}^{i}(s^{\tau})\Big) &= q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})y_{t}^{i}(s^{t}) \\ + \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} q_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau}) \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^{i}(s^{\tau})\Big) & \text{ (if } \tilde{c}_{t}^{i}(s^{t}) = c_{t}^{i*}(s^{t}) \text{)} \\ \to \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} q_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau}) \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^{i}(s^{\tau})\Big) &= \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} q_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau}) \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^{i}(s^{\tau})\Big) \end{split}$$

Therefore, given $\tilde{c}_t^i(s^t) = c_t^{i*}(s^t)$, portfolio $\{\tilde{a}_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1},s^t)\}_{s_{t+1}\in S}$ is affordable.

◆ back