Macro II

Professor Griffy

UAlbany

Spring 2023

Announcements


- Today: the Mortensen and Pissarides model (canonical equilibrium search)
- Homework will be posted on my website.
- Code for Aiyagari w/ labor-leisure choice on the cluster.
- Due Thursday after class ends (5/4).
- No class next week! Two short assignments to be posted on my website. Not graded, just to help prep for the final.

Arrival Rates of Job Offers

- Last time: we assumed that the arrival rate of job offers is exogenous: regardless of equilibrium, the frequency with which you receive an offer is the same.
- Consider an example:
 - 1. There is a productivity downturn:
 - 2. How does a firm respond?
 - 3. McCall model: the quality of the offer distribution deteriorates, but searchers receive offers at the same rate.
- Essentially, slackness in the labor market is due to worker selectivity, not due to decisions made by the firm.
- Obviously, firms do respond.

The Beveridge Curve

Another implication: there is no relationship between unemployment and vacancy creation.



The DMP Model ("Ch. 1 of Pissarides (2000)")

Agents:

- 1. Employed workers;
- 2. unemployed workers;
- 3. vacant firms;
- 4. matched firms.

• Linear utility (u = b, u = w) and production y = p > b.

- Matching function:
 - 1. Determines number of meetings between firms & workers.
 - 2. Args: levels searchers & vacancies ($U = u \times L, V = v \times L$)
 - 3. Constant returns to scale (L is lab. force):

$$M(uL, vL) = uL \times M(1, \frac{v}{u}) = uL \times p(\theta)$$

- 4. where $\theta = \frac{v}{u}$ is "labor market tightness"
- 5. Match rates:

$$\underbrace{p(\theta)}_{Worker} = \theta \underbrace{q(\theta)}_{Firm}$$

Worker Value Functions

Value functions:

- 1. Employed at wage w: W(w)
- 2. Unemployed: U.

Unemployed flow value:

$$rU = b + p(\theta)E[W(w) - U]$$

Employed flow value:

$$rW(w) = w + \delta[U - W(w)]$$

Firm Value Functions

Value functions:

- 1. Filled, paying wage w: J(w)
- 2. Vacant V.

Vacant flow value:

$$rV = -\kappa + q(\theta)E[J(w) - V]$$

Matched flow value:

$$rJ(w) = (p - w) + \delta[V - J(w)]$$

Free entry equilibrium condition:

$$rV = 0$$

 $ightarrow rac{\kappa}{E[J(w)]} = q(heta)$

This is just a market clearing condition!

Equilibrium Objects

Three key equilibrium objects:

- 1. Wages;
- 2. unemployment;
- 3. $\theta = \frac{v}{u}$ (vacancies).
- ▶ How we determine each of these is largely a modeling decision.
- Steady-state: pin down unemployment via flow equation.
- Free-entry: Assume that firms always post vacancies so that free entry binds.
- Wages: Assume that wages are determined by a surplus-(profit) sharing rule.

Steady-State Unemployment

Flow of unemployment:

$$\dot{u}=\delta(1-u)-p(\theta)u$$

Steady-state:

$$0 = \delta(1 - u) - p(\theta)u$$
$$p(\theta)u = \delta(1 - u)$$
$$u = \frac{\delta}{\delta + p(\theta)}$$

Same as McCall with α = p(θ).
(Note: no heterogeneity & p > b → all wages accepted.)

Free Entry

Free entry
$$V = 0$$
:

$$rJ(w) = (p - w) + \delta[\mathcal{V} - J(w)]$$
$$(r + \delta)J(w) = (p - w)$$

Vacancy creation condition (i.e., free entry imposed):

$$q(\theta) = \frac{\kappa}{E[J(w)]}$$
$$q(\theta) = \frac{\kappa(r+\delta)}{(p-w)}$$
$$\theta = q^{-1}(\frac{\kappa(r+\delta)}{(p-w)})$$

- Thus, mapping between wages and θ. 1 equation, 2 unknowns.
- Need equation to determine wages in equilibrium.

Workers and firms bargain over the surplus of a match.

Surplus of a match:

$$S(w) = W(w) + J(w) - U - \cancel{W}$$

$$S(w) = W(w) + J(w) - U$$

Nash Bargaining splits this surplus according to a bargaining weight, β:

$$w = \operatorname{argmax}_{w} \underbrace{(W(w) - U)^{\beta}}_{Net \ Utility} \underbrace{(J(w) - V)^{1-\beta}}_{Net \ Profits}$$

Nash Bargaining splits this surplus according to a bargaining weight, β:

$$w = \operatorname{argmax}_{w} \underbrace{(W(w) - U)^{\beta}}_{Net \ Utility} \underbrace{(J(w) - V)^{1-\beta}}_{Net \ Profits}$$

$$0 = \beta (W(w) - U)^{\beta-1} (J(w) - V)^{1-\beta} \frac{\partial W}{\partial w}$$

$$+ (1 - \beta) (J(w) - V)^{-\beta} (W(w) - U) \frac{\partial J}{\partial w}$$

$$\frac{\partial W}{\partial w} = 1, \ \frac{\partial J}{\partial w} = -1:$$

$$\beta (\frac{J(w)}{W(w) - U})^{1-\beta} = (1 - \beta) (\frac{W(w) - U}{J(w)})^{\beta}$$

$$\beta (J(w) + W(w) - U) = W(w) - U$$

$$\beta S(w) = W(w) - U$$

Nash Bargaining splits this surplus according to a bargaining weight, β:

$$w = \operatorname{argmax}_{w} \underbrace{(W(w) - U)^{\beta}}_{Net \ Utility} \underbrace{(J(w) - V)^{1-\beta}}_{Net \ Profits}$$

w solves $(W(w) - U) = \beta(W(w) + J(w) - U) = \beta S(w)$

Plug in for each of these:

$$(1 - \beta)[W(w) - U] = \beta J(w)$$

$$\beta J(w) = (1 - \beta)[w - \delta(U - V(w))$$

$$-b - p(\theta)(W(w) - U)]$$

$$(1 - \beta)(w - b) = \beta J(w) + (1 - \beta)(p(\theta) + \delta)[W(w) - U]$$

$$(1 - \beta)(w - b) = \beta(p - w - \delta J(w))$$

$$+ (1 - \beta)(p(\theta) + \delta)[W(w) - U]$$

$$w = (1 - \beta)b + \beta p + \beta \theta \kappa$$

Computation

- How would we solve this model?
- Need way to compute three equilibrium objects:
 - 1. Wages;
 - 2. unemployment;
 - 3. $\theta = \frac{v}{u}$ (vacancies).
- ▶ How we determine each of these is largely a modeling decision.
- Steady-state: pin down unemployment via flow equation.
- Free-entry: Assume that firms always post vacancies so that free entry binds.
- Wages: Assume that wages are determined by a surplus-(profit) sharing rule.
- Computation:
 - ► Wages, vacancies: depend on surplus.
 - Unemployment: law of motion.
- Here: add aggregate shocks.

Worker Value Functions

Value functions:

- 1. Employed at wage w: W(w)
- 2. Unemployed: U.

Unemployed flow value:

$$rU(z) = b + p(\theta)E[W(w, z) - U(z)] + \gamma E[U(z') - U(z)]$$

Employed flow value:

$$rW(w, z) = w(z) + \delta[U(z) - W(w, z)] + \gamma E[W(w', z') - W(w, z)]$$

Firm Value Functions

Value functions:

- 1. Filled, paying wage w: J(w)
- 2. Vacant V.

Vacant flow value:

$$rV(z) = -\kappa + q(\theta(z))E[J(w,z) - V(z)] + \gamma[V(z') - V(w,z)]$$

Matched flow value:

$$rJ(w,z) = (z + p - w) + \delta[V(z) - J(w,z)]$$
$$+ \gamma[J(w',z') - J(w,z)]$$

Free entry equilibrium condition:

$$rV = 0$$

 $ightarrow rac{\kappa}{E[J(w,z)]} = q(heta)$

Computation

Surplus of a match:

$$S(w,z) = W(w,z) + J(w,z) - U(z) - V(z)$$

$$S(w,z) = W(w,z) + J(w,z) - U(z)$$

Plugging in and using βS(w, z) is workers surplus and (1−β)S(w, z) is firm surplus:

$$S(z) = \frac{p+z}{r+\delta+\gamma} - \frac{b+\theta\kappa\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}}{r+\delta+\gamma} + \frac{\gamma}{r+\delta+\gamma}\int_{z'}S(x)dF(x)$$

- This is just a contraction: $\frac{\gamma}{r+\delta+\gamma} < 1$.
- Pick $S_0(z_i) = 0$, $\forall i$ and iterate.
- Yields vacancies $q(\theta) = \frac{\kappa}{(1-\beta)S(z)}$ and wages $(w = \beta S(z))$.

Next Time

Either:

- Efficiency in search (Hosios Condition);
- or Directed/competitive search.
- ▶ Final homework due Thursday after last class (5/4).
- One more in-person class (5/2)!